Study of buffer overflow attacks and microarchitectural defenses by Xu, Jingfeng
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations 
1-1-2002 
Study of buffer overflow attacks and microarchitectural defenses 
Jingfeng Xu 
Iowa State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd 
Recommended Citation 
Xu, Jingfeng, "Study of buffer overflow attacks and microarchitectural defenses" (2002). Retrospective 
Theses and Dissertations. 21366. 
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/21366 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and 
Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses 
and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, 
please contact digirep@iastate.edu. 
Study of buffer overflow attacks and microarchitectural defenses 
by 
JingfengXu 
A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
Major: Computer Science 
Program of Study Committee: 
Akhilesh Tyagi, Major Professor 
Simanta Mitra 
Doug Jacobson 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
2002 
11 
Graduate College 
Iowa State University 
This is to certify that the master's thesis of 
JingfengXu 
has met the thesis requirements of Iowa State University 
Signatures have been redacted for privacy 
111 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
Section 1. What is a buffer overflow attack 
Section 2. History and popularity 
Chapter 2. How does it work 
Section 1. Basic framework 
Section 2. Buffer overflow attacks 
Section 3. Advanced techniques 
Chapter 3. The defenses 
Section 1. Static method 
Section 2. Dynamic methods 
Chapter 4. Our method 
Section 1. Program counter encoding 
Section 2. hnplementation 
Section 3. Performance overhead 
Chapter 5. Exploit experiments 
Section 1. Exploits 
Section 2. Limitations and future work 
Chapter 6. Conclusions 
References 
1 
1 
1 
3 
3 
7 
11 
14 
14 
16 
19 
19 
23 
25 
30 
30 
33 
35 
36 
1 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
Section 1. What Is a Buffer Overflow Attack ? 
Buffer overflow means filling a buffer with input which has larger size than the size of 
the buffer. In C programming language, buffer overflow is possible since there is no array 
boundary checking when copying strings. When a program takes input string and copies the 
string into an internal buffer without checking the length of the input string, and the length of 
the string is larger than the size of the internal buffer, then a buffer overflow happens and this 
program can be potentially exploited. The input string could come from different sources, 
such as command line, environment variable or network if the vulnerable program is running 
as a daemon. The internal buffers in the vulnerable program which are suitable for this attack 
are normally located near some important memory blocks like activation records of 
procedure calls and function pointers. By overflowing such internal buffers, the adjacent 
memory blocks can be overwritten by some memory address which points to some malicious 
instructions located somewhere in the memory or in the overflowed buffer. Then attackers 
can gain the control flow of the vulnerable program and obtain partial or full privilege of the 
host machine. Under UNIX/Linux system, the unrestricted root privilege can be obtained if 
the vulnerable program is owned by the root. 
Section 2. History and Popularity 
Buffer overflow attack is one of the most common network attacks for the last 10 years. 
The first buffer overflow attack was caused by Robert Tappan Morris's Internet Worm in 
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November 1988 which brought down more than 6000 sites. After that there were not many 
new buffer overflow attacks until some popular introductory articles came out in between 
1996-1998, including [1, 2, 3, 4]. Aleph One's paper [1] is the first one which focuses on 
buffer overflow attacks on Intel x86 Linux platform and many of the early buffer overflow 
exploit codes for vulnerable programs were based on the technique illustrated in this paper. 
To see the frequency of buffer overflow attacks, one can scan some popular security 
web sites. For CERT/CC [5], the Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center 
at the Software Engineering Institute of Carnegie Mellon University, in 1998, 7 out of 13 
advisories were due to buffer overflows, in 1999, 9 out of 17 were due to buffer overflows, in 
2000, 3 out of 22 were due to buffer overflows. 
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Chapter 2. How Does It Work? 
The internal buffer could be located in stack, which is the most common case, or static 
storage, or heap. The control flow of the vulnerable program can be obtained by overwriting 
some important memory blocks adjacent to the internal buffer. The case of overwriting 
activation records is considered here. 
Section 1. Basic Framework 
In Unix/Linux system, when a process starts, its memory space is organized as follows. 
The virtual memory space goes from OxOOOOOOOO to OxFFFFFFFF. Program text resides in 
the lowest memory block, then initialized static data area, then uninitialized static data area 
(BSS). From the highest memory comes the kernel stack area, then the user stack area. 
Between the user stack area and the data segment is the heap where dynamic allocated 
storages reside. In Unix/Linux, stack grows downwards, i.e., from high memory address to 
low memory address, whereas heap grows upwards, i.e., from low memory to high memory. 
In the user stack area, starting from the high memory address, the first is the environment 
variable strings ifthe vulnerable program declares to use them, then the argument strings if 
the vulnerable program declares to use them, then the envp pointer, then the argv pointer, 
then the argc, then the stack frame for the main function, then the stack frames for other 
procedure calls, so on and so forth. 
In Intel x86/Linux system, the register ESP is used as the stack pointer which points to 
the top of the stack, register EBP is used as the frame pointer which points to the base 
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memory address of the current activation record. The stack pointer changes with any push 
and pop operations, while the frame pointer stays unchanged during a procedure call. So all 
of the local variables and temporaries can be conveniently addressed by offsets from the 
frame pointer. The call sequence when a procedure call is made and the return sequence 
when a procedure returns vary with different platforms and compilers. In the following, Intel 
x86/Linux platform and GCC compiler is considered. 
Call Sequence 
First, the caller evaluates the actual parameters to the callee procedure and pushes these 
actuals on the stack in reverse order, i.e., for a function call off oo (a, b, c) , c is 
pushed into the stack, then b, then a. The reverse order is important for those procedures 
with variable number of parameters like C run-time library function printf. The first 
parameter ofprintf is the string format which contains the information of the following 
parameters. By scanning this string, the callee can easily determine the total number of 
parameters. Since this string is the last actual being pushed on the stack, so it can be 
addressed by some offset from the frame pointer. But ifthe actuals are pushed on stack in 
sequence, then the first string can not be located by the callee, and therefore the number of 
total parameters can not be determined. 
Second, the caller pushes the return address, i.e., the current value of register EIP, on the 
stack and loads the callee's starting address into EIP. Register EIP is the instruction pointer 
for Intel x86, which points to the address of the next instruction to be executed, so the control 
flow switches to the callee. These activities are initiated with one instruction, call foo. In 
Intel x86, the return value of a procedure (if there is any) is passed through registers, 
generally EAX and other general registers like EDX (for gee, this is the case) if more than 
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one register is needed. So there is no need to allocate storage for the return value in the stack 
before the caller transfers control to the callee. 
Now the control is in the callee function. The callee needs to do some housekeeping 
work encapsulated in function prologue before anything else. Generally, function prologue 
does the following work. 
1. Save the value of the frame pointer EBP onto the stack. Sometimes from efficiency 
considerations, the stack pointer, instead of the frame pointer is used to address local 
variables, then there is no need to save the frame pointer and EBP can also be used as a 
general register. In GNU C compiler, this can be done with the switch -f omit -
frame-pointer. With this switch, the compiler won't generate frame pointer related 
instructions. 
2. If the frame pointer is used, then the frame pointer is adjusted by loading the value of 
the stack pointer in it. 
3. Allocate the storage for the local variables and possible temporaries inside the callee 
function and initialize the locals if needed. This can be done by simply decrementing 
the stack pointer with the number of bytes needed for the local variables. The locals 
and temporaries then can be easily addressed by some (negative) offset from the frame 
pointer. 
4. If other general registers are used inside the callee function, the callee also needs to 
save the values of these registers on the stack and restore these values before it returns. 
At this point, the callee begins execution. 
For an Intel x86 and GCC compiler, the function prologue looks like the following. The 
following assembly uses AT&T style instead of the Intel x86 native style. 
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pushl %ebp /* push EBP onto stack */ 
movl %esp,%ebp /* move ESP to EBP */ 
subl $12,%esp /* decrement ESP to allocate storage */ 
pushl %edx /* if EDX needs to be saved */ 
Return Sequence 
Before the callee function returns, it executes its function epilogue. The epilogue is 
responsible for restoring the saved registers and stack pointer to their values at the entry into 
the function, and returning control to the caller. In the function epilogue, the following work 
is performed. 
1. If there are any general registers that were saved in the function prologue stage, then 
restore them. 
2. Release the current stack frame. If the frame pointer is involved, first move EBP to the 
ESP, so now the top of the stack is the saved frame pointer, i.e., the base address of the 
caller's stack frame. Then pop the stack to EBP, so that the old frame pointer is 
restored. These two steps can be done with one instruction, leave. If no frame 
pointer is involved, then simply increment the stack pointer by the size of the current 
stack frame. 
3. Transfer control to the caller. This is done by popping the stack to EIP with instruction 
ret. For an Intel x86, the function epilogue looks as the follows. 
popl %edx /* if EDX needs to be restored */ 
movl %ebp,%esp /* release callee's stack frame*/ 
popl %ebp /* restore the caller's frame pointer */ 
ret /* return to the caller */ 
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When the caller has the control, it needs to pop the actual parameters (if any) provided 
to the callee. 
Section 2. Buff er Overflow Attacks 
Buffer overflow attack code tries to overwrite the activation records of the vulnerable 
program, in particular, the return address part of the activation records. 
Figure 1. Stack layout of a running program. 
high memory 
address 
low memory 
address 
+ 
....__ 
savedFP 
argv, envp 
& locals 
return address 
savedFP 
local buffer 
Typical simple buffer overflow attacks overflow the local buffer on the stack of the 
vulnerable programs. As an example, consider the following case. The attacking program 
first forms a string and provides it to the vulnerable program as an input. Common places to 
put this string include the command line argument to the vulnerable program and 
8 
environment variables. The vulnerable program copies this input string into its local buffer 
without boundary checking. In C language, the run-time function strcpy copies all of the 
source string to the destination until the null terminator of the source string is found. The 
length of the input string is greater than the size of the local buffer in the vulnerable program 
and is large enough to overwrite the return address part of the activation record adjacent to 
the local buffer when being copied to the buffer. The attacking program puts a memory 
address or a sequence of the same memory address in somewhere in this input string so that 
the return address part of the activation record of vulnerable program in which the local 
buffer is declared is overwritten by this memory address after the buffer copy. When the 
vulnerable program returns from the function in which the local buffer is declared, the 
corrupted return address is loaded into the program counter and the control will be 
transferred to the location specified by the memory address in the malicious input string. The 
memory address in the input string typically points to some malicious instructions the 
attacker wants to execute. And these instructions can also be put into somewhere in the input 
string. 
The most common malicious instructions are to spawn a shell, so these type instructions 
are also commonly called shell code. One simple way to get a shell is to make an exec 
system call as follows. 
foo () { 
} 
char *name[2]; 
name[O] = "/bin/sh"; 
name[l] =NULL; 
execl (name[O], name, NULL); 
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With the help of a debugger, the corresponding machine code can be easily found. The 
following Intel x86 instructions do the same work as the code above. First set BAX to Oxb, 
which is the system call code corresponding to exec, then store the three parameters in 
EBX, ECX, EDX, respectively and followed by an software interrupt, int 80. 
mov $addr %esi /* here addr is the address to "/bin/sh" */ 
mov %esi,Ox8(%esi) 
xor %eax,%eax /* set EAX to 0 %/ 
mov %al,Ox7(%esi) 
mov %eax,Oxc(%esi) 
mov $0xb,%al /* set EAX to Oxb */ 
mov %esi,%ebx 
lea Ox8(%esi) ,%ecx 
lea Oxc(%esi) ,%edx 
int $0x80 /* make the system call */ 
In the assembly code above, the address of the string "/bin/ sh" is still unknown before run 
time. There is a trick here to fill in the address dynamically at run time. It takes advantage of 
the fact that before control is transferred to the callee when a direct call is made, the PC 
(value ofEIP) is pushed into the stack. So if the address of the string "/bin/ sh" is put right 
behind a direct call instruction, then this address is dynamically pushed into the stack before 
control transfers and is known to the attacking code. The trick works as follows. 
jmp $offset_to_call /* jump to the call instruction */ 
pop %esi /* pop the address of "/bin/sh" to %esi */ 
mov %esi,Ox8(%esi) 
xor %eax,%eax /* set EAX to O %/ 
mov %al,Ox7(%esi) 
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mov %eax,Oxc(%esi) 
mov $0xb,%al /* set EAX to Oxb */ 
mov %esi,%ebx 
lea Ox8(%esi),%ecx 
lea Oxc(%esi),%edx 
int $Ox80 /* make the system call */ 
call $offset_to_pop /* call the pop instruction */ 
"/bin/sh" 
When this shell code starts to execute, it jumps to the cal 1 instruction, the cal 1 
instruction transfer control to the pop instruction, but before the control transfer happens, 
the PC, which is the memory address right after the call instruction, i.e., the address of the 
string" /bin/ sh", is pushed on the stack. Then this address is popped into ESI register by 
the pop instruction so is known to the attacking code. The memory address offsets which 
are used in j mp and cal 1 instructions can be easily calculated using a debugger by 
counting the number of bytes those instructions take. These assembly instructions are 
converted into hexadecimal numbers to put into the input string. There can not be any zero 
hex numbers appeared in the shell code, otherwise the string copy functions in C will stop 
copying when it hits a null byte. To eliminate zero numbers in an instruction, some 
equivalent alternative instructions have to be used. For example, instruction "mov $ 0 
%eax" can be substituted by another instruction "xor %eax, %eax", which does not 
contain any null bytes. 
In the input string given to the vulnerable program, there is also a memory address 
which is used to overwrite the saved PC of the activation record. Normally, these address 
bytes are put in the end part of the input string and this address points to the beginning of the 
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buffer which is being overflowed. When the function returns, the bytes at the very beginning 
of the buffer are fetched and interpreted as a machine instruction to execute. If the buffer is in 
the stack, as long as the stack is executable, which is true for Intel x86 architecture, the 
control will transfer to the malicious code contained in the post-overflowed buffer. The 
probability of overwriting the saved PC on the stack can be greatly increased by putting 
adjacent copies of such return address and by trying different memory address alignments. 
The best case for attack is that the address used to overflow the saved PC points to the start 
of the shell code in the overflowed buffer. But it requires many experiments to get the exact 
memory address. Much of the effort can be saved by putting some null instructions right in 
the front part of the shell code. Null instruction is a machine instruction which does nothing, 
it's encoded as Ox90 in x86 instruction set. So even ifthe address does not point to the shell 
code, as long as it points to one of the null instructions, the control will ultimately transfer to 
the shell code. If a shell is spawned by the shell code and the vulnerable program is owned 
by root and has SUID bit set, then root privilege can be gained. 
Section 3. Advanced Techniques 
The basic buffer overflow attack technique is discussed in last section. There are some 
advanced techniques which are useful in attacking those less vulnerable programs. 
Filter Passing 
There are many vulnerable programs having potential buffer overflow problems, but 
some of them are hard to exploit because they filter the input string. For example, a filter 
could convert all input characters into upper case or it could filter out some special characters 
like '#', '! ', etc. For an even worse case, if a vulnerable program filters out all printable 
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characters, then it is really hard to exploit the vulnerability. Here a simpler case is 
considered. Assume that a program converts all characters in the input string to uppercase 
before copying them into the buffer. Then the shellcode cannot contain any lower case 
characters. The characters in the string" /bin/ sh" can be easily converted to lower case 
characters after the buffer is overflowed by subtracting 56 from them, i.e., the offset of lower 
case and upper case characters. For the machine instructions with lower case characters, 
alternative instructions with no lower case characters have to be used and these substitute 
instructions generally are not too hard to find. 
Retrieve Root UID 
For local buffer overflow attacks, getting a root shell is the final goal. To obtain such a 
root privilege, the vulnerable program has to be owned by the root, can be executed from 
non-root user, and the SUID bit has to be set. Otherwise, even ifthe program could be 
exploited and a shell spawned, it still is a user shell and worth nothing to a local user. Many 
programmers think that by using setuid (getuid () ) function calls the root suid can 
be dropped. So they make such calls at the very beginning of the program and only call 
setuid ( o) when root uid is required and drop it immediately after that. But that is not as 
safe as it might look. The attacker can retrieve the root uid by adding setuid ( O) at the 
beginning of the shell code . 
Remote Buffer Overflow Attacks 
Remote buffer overflow can be much more harmful since it does not require a local user 
account. The attack is mounted through the network, so it is harder to trace the attacker. 
Remote buffer overflows are also harder to exploit than the local buffer overflow. They 
generally need more work and much longer shellcode to open sockets. Since the vulnerable 
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programs run on remote machines, even if the attacker successfully overflows the buffer with 
shellcode, the shell spawned is on the remote machine. So to take advantage of the spawned 
shell, the network sockets need to be connected to the standard 110 ports of the attacker 
machine. To attack a TCP-based daemon, the general idea is to first open a connection to the 
vulnerable daemon, then send the shellcode via the network to overflow the buffer in the 
vulnerable daemon. After the buffer is successfully overflowed, the shellcode opens a 
backdoor port which can accept connection requests as a server and then spawn a shell. The 
shellcode then connects this port to stdin, stdout, stderr of the shell just spawned 
via dup2 system calls. On the client side, the attacking program then tries to connect to that 
backdoor port on the vulnerable machine. If it succeeds, then it also connects its stdin, 
stdout, stderr to the local socket connected to the remote machine. By using this 
approach, the attacker can take advantage of the spawned shell on the remote machine. Of 
course, the length of the shellcode is much larger given the complexity of those system calls 
for opening and binding sockets, listening and accepting connection request and changing 
1/0 ports, but it is still possible to restrict the size of shellcode to about 200 bytes. For many 
vulnerable daemons, the input buffer is larger than this size. 
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Chapter 3. The Defenses 
There are many ways of preventing buffer overflow that have been proposed and 
implemented. Generally, these methods fall into two wide categories, static methods and 
dynamic (run-time) methods. Static methods try to detect and eliminate the potential 
vulnerabilities before the deployment of program. Dynamic methods focus on invalidating 
any attack attempts at run time. 
The disadvantage of runtime methods is that they increase the runtime overhead. Also 
when the attacks are detected, the running program typically will be shutdown, so the buffer 
overflow attacks are effectively converted to a denial-of-service attack for those server 
programs. The overhead of static method happens only before the software is deployed, they 
do not impose runtime overhead. But one drawback of the static methods is they normally 
cannot eliminate all of the possible vulnerabilities, and they can also incorrectly predict 
vulnerabilities, so all of these require further human auditing. 
Section 1. Static Methods 
Writing Correct Code 
As we discussed in the previous chapter, the most common buffer overflows come from 
those dangerous function calls like sprintf, gets, etc., since these functions do not do 
buffer boundary checking for array and pointer references. These functions should be 
avoided as much as possible. 
Unfortunately, programs that use just the "safe" subset of the C string API are not 
necessarily safe, because the "safe" string primitives have their own pitfalls. Function 
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strncpy may leave the target buffer unterminated. In comparison, strncat and 
snprintf always append a terminating' \0' byte. Also using strncpy has 
performance implication since it zero-fills all the available space in the buffer after the null 
terminator. Furthermore, if these "safe" version functions are used with an elementary off-
by-one error, then there could be potential buffer overflow vulnerabilities. 
Fault Injection 
Fault injection technique is mainly used in software assurance for analyzing the 
behavior of programs under those anomalous conditions such as unexpected input from 
users. Anup Ghosh [6] applied this technique in FIST (The Fault Injection Security Tool) to 
analyze potential buffer overflows in programs. FIST inserts malicious strings (instructions) 
into potentially vulnerable buffers identified by the analyst during program execution and 
observes the effect on system security. FIST employs several different fault injection 
functions that simulate the effects of program errors and malicious threats against programs. 
FIST can read the stack frame in which the vulnerable buffer resides and locate the return 
address and overwrite this address to point to the buffer, by doing this, it can simulate a 
potential buffer overflow attack. If the malicious code (such as modifying local file system) 
gets executed, then a real attack can also happen. 
Source Code Lexical I Syntax/ Semantics Analysis 
There are many methods that fall in this category. Generally, these methods are used to 
detect wide range of security holes, not just buffer overflows. We do not discuss them 
extensively here. 
Lexical analyzer can be as simple as using "grep" to catch dangerous function calls, or 
as complicated as IST4 [7], which scan the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities 
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based on a database of dangerous constructs. 
Syntax/semantic analyzers include [8], and LCLint (now called Splint) [9], as some 
examples. 
Section 2. Dynamic Methods 
Buffer Bounds Checking 
The buffer overflow attacks happen only because of C's feature of not checking bounds 
of array and pointer references. So if we have a C language extension that does bounds 
checking, it will automatically prevent any buffer overflow attacks. 
In an extension to the GNU C compiler, Richard Jones and Paul Kelly [10] have 
developed a new method to enforce array bounds and pointers checking in the C language. 
They make the check without changing the representation of pointers, so checked code is 
compatible with unchecked code. But the performance penalties are substantial For an ij k 
matrix multiplication, there is a 30x slowdown reported. 
Stack Integrity Check of 1 ibc Functions 
Alexandre Snarskii [11] has written a patch to 1 ibc to make FreeBSD unexploitable 
with standard stack overflow attacks. This patch checks the integrity of stack before calls of 
those dangerous libc functions like strcpy, gets return. Because the patch is only for 
C library functions, vulnerabilities in user-defined functions still exist and continue to 
threaten the security of computer systems. 
StackGuard 
StackGuard [12] [13] is a compiler enhancement to provide integrity checking to the 
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return address in function activation records. When generating code for function entry, the 
compiler puts a canary word next to every return address in the stack. It generates code in the 
function epilogue to check the integrity of the canary before jumping to the return address. 
The canary is either a randomly generated value or a terminator (such as 0, which will 
effectively terminate those functions like strcpy), so StackGuard can either detect the 
compromise of the return address or prevent the modification of return address. But if 
attackers can guess the canary value, this method will not work. Also under certain 
conditions attackers could overwrite the pre-computed canary values with their own values to 
tum off the protection. Furthermore, due to alignment requirement, it is possible to overwrite 
a return address but skip over the canary word. 
The major limitation of StackGuard is that it changes the format of an activation record. 
It will not be compatible with those programs that are introspective with respect to the format 
of data on the stack. For instance, GDB inspects other program's stack frames, and thus will 
fail to produce correct stack traces when applied to StackGuard-protected programs. The 
Linux kernel also does not compile under StackGuard. 
Non-Executable User Stack 
Injecting code into stack frames and overwriting the return address to point to the 
injected code is the most common form of buffer overflow attacks. So a natural solution 
would be making a stack non-executable. With a non-executable stack, even if an attacker 
can successfully load some malicious instructions on the victim program's stack and also 
successfully has control flow transfer to the malicious instructions, he still can not have the 
malicious instruction executed. Solar Designer [14] implemented such a solution by 
providing a patch for Linux kernel to make the stack non-executable. But this method only 
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works for traditional and standard stack attacks. Exploit code injected into data segment still 
can hijack the attacked program. 
A big problem with this method is that sometimes the stack is required to be executable. 
For example, Linux signal handler returns need an executable stack. Nested function calls 
and trampoline functions also need an executable stack to work properly. And functional 
languages, e.g. LISP, also need an executable stack. In order to solve these problems, the 
patch needs to temporarily set the stack as executable when these events occur. But this also 
creates a window for attackers to launch .a buffer overflow attack. 
Another type of common buffer overflow attacks is to point the return address to a 
function in 1 ibc, usually system. To prevent such kind of attacks, the same patch also 
changes the default address that shared libraries are mmap()'ed at. But simply changing the 
default address that shared libraries are mmap()'ed is not enough. The fact is that exploit 
codes do not have to call l ibc functions like system ( ) directly. If a vulnerable program 
calls libc function, the text segment of this program will contain a PLT (procedure linkage 
table) entry which can be used for exploiting purpose. There are already some exploits which 
can get around non-executable stack patch [ 15]. 
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Chapter 4. Our Method 
Most of the proposed protection or detection schemes focus on data. We, instead, focus 
on program counter integrity. Until the attack takes over the control by updating program 
counter for its advantage, the system secure is considered. Only program counter is 
necessary to be protected. For example, we encode the program counter to handle buffer 
overflow attacks. · 
Section 1. Program Counter Encoding 
The basic idea is to encode every instances of program counter saved on the stack, 
which are vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks. During a procedure call~ instead of storing 
the value of the program counter to the stack as the return address directly, we encode it by 
doing MEM [%sp] +- e (PC) • On the return from a procedure call, when the return 
address in the activation record is restored into the program counter, it is decoded by a 
decoding function d such that d(e(v)) = v. 
This scheme works as long as every PC value goes through both the encoding and 
decoding processes. In a buffer overflow, the attacker's intended return address will only go 
through the decoding stage and when its decoded value is loaded to the program counter, 
control flow will be transferred to somewhere other than the attacker's intended location, and 
eventually it will lead to an exception. So this method suffices to prevent the most typical 
buffer overflow attacks. 
Microarchitecture I Compiler Support 
The program counter encoding/decoding can be implemented either on 
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microarchitecture level or on compiler level. In this paper, we will focus on the compiler 
support of PC encoding. 
Encoder/Decoder 
The encoding and decoding functions can have variable complexity, from as simple as 
bitwise exclusive-or to any arbitrary complex. Here we consider the simplest case, with a 
compiler support of bitwise exclusive-or encoder/decoder. To support encoding/decoding the 
PC value in the activation record, the compiler only needs to add some extra instructions in 
the function prologue and epilogue section. Some simple choices of the encoder/decoder key 
include the frame pointer and the stack pointer. 
If the frame pointer FP is used as the encoding/decoding key, the function prologue will 
look like the following, 
xorl (%esp) , %ebp, (%esp) /*use FP to encode the return address, which is the 
top of the stack at this time *I 
pushl %ebp /*save the last frame pointer*/ 
movl %esp, %ebp /*update the frame pointer to the base address of this stack frame 
(of this function)*/ 
and the function epilogue looks like, 
pop any local variables /* at this time, the top of the 
stack is the saved frame pointer of the last stack frame */ 
movl %ebp, %esp /* pop stack frame */ 
popl %ebp /* restore the last frame pointer, after 
this pop, the top of stack is the return address */ 
xorl (%sp), %ebp, (%sp) /*decoding the return address 
using the last frame pointer */ 
ret /* pop to PC */ 
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The encoding/decoding can be implemented with only one extra instruction in the 
function prologue and epilogue, respectively. Obviously, the overhead of this security feature 
will be the least. One disadvantage of using frame pointer as the encoding/decoding key is 
that for efficiency consideration some program could be compiled with an option of not 
generating frame-pointer related code, gee has such a compiling switch. In this case, the 
instruction 2 and 3 in the prologue, and the instruction 2 and 3 in epilogue will not be 
generated. Then this framework will not work unless the FP has the same value in the entry 
and exit points of the function call. Otherwise, the encoding and decoding keys are different 
and the result is unpredictable. In a typical buffer overflow, one same value (return address) 
is used to fill the very end part of the long string which is used to overflow a local buffer. 
That means both the saved frame pointer and the return address (on the stack) typically 
contain the same value since these two memory locations are adjacent to each other. Then in 
the decoding stage, the instruction 
xorl (%esp) ,%ebp, (%esp), 
which does 
return address ~ return address E9 saved frame pointer 
will produce 0. After this 0 value being loaded to PC, an interrupt (exception) will be 
generated on most of the operating systems. So by using the frame pointer as the 
encoding/decoding key, it will provide a significant check of any potential buffer overflow 
attacks if a 0 address is loaded in PC. 
Another choice of simple encoding/decoding key is the stack pointer. The function 
prologue looks like 
xorl (%esp), %esp, (%esp) /* use SP to encode the return 
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address, which is the top of the stack at this time */ 
pushl %ebp /* save the last frame pointer */ 
movl %esp, %ebp /* update the frame pointer */ 
and the function epilogue looks like, 
pop any local variables /* at this time, the top of the 
stack is the saved frame pointer of the last stack frame */ 
movl %ebp, %esp /*pop off callee's stack frame */ 
popl %ebp /* restore the last frame pointer, after this 
pop, the top of stack is the return address of the caller */ 
xorl (%esp),%esp, (%esp) /*decoding the return address 
using the stack pointer */ 
ret /* pop to PC */ 
From the function prologue and epilogue, we can see that the value of the keys for 
encoding and decoding are the same. This allows the correctness of the normal program 
execution in function calls. Also since the value of the stack pointer changes dynamically in 
program execution, so the encoding/decoding key also updates dynamically, which 
significantly improves the security of this PC encoding mechanism. The advantage of using 
stack pointer as the key is that it does not depend on the FP register, so that even if non-
frame-pointer compilation option is chosen, the framework will still work. After a typical 
buffer overflow which tends to overwrite the return address and the saved frame pointer with 
the same value, the recovered frame pointer will be changed (points to the entry point of the 
malicious instructions typically). But since the SP value is not recovered from the stack, so 
the key used for decoding does not change, it will always be the same as the encoding key. 
Then the value which is loaded to PC will be the result ofxor'ing the address intended by the 
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attacker and the stack pointer, and it will not be 0 except that the address happens to be the 
same as the stack pointer. Under Linux, every process has a virtual memory space of 4G 
bytes in size. The upper 1 G is reserved for kernel usage, the lower 3G is used for text 
segment, data segment, heap and the user stack. The user stack starts from OxBFFFFFFF and 
grows downward. For most of the programs that do not have a very deep function call trace, 
the stack pointer tends to be like OxBFFFxxxx. If the attacker injects the malicious code into 
stack, then the intended return address will also be like OxBFFFxxxx, then the result PC 
value will be OxOOOOxxxx, this address does not fall into the text segment of a process under 
Linux since in Linux the text segment of a running process starting at Ox8048000. So an 
interrupt will also be generated for such a case. 
Section 2. Implementation 
Program counter encoding by compilation enhancement is selected for implementation 
here. To protect the return address in activation records, most of the compilation 
enhancement methods, such as StackGuard, need to add some runtime return address 
protection mechanisms in the function prologue and epilogue. Since every function call will 
have to run these extra instructions, the overall overhead increases rapidly. Obviously, there 
is a trade-off between security and performance. If the protection mechanism requires too 
many instructions in these sections, then the runtime overhead tends to be very large and the 
performance penalty will defeat the benefit of security provided by such a protection and 
makes the method practically impossible. Bearing this consideration in mind, we choose the 
simplest exclusive-or encoding method, with either the frame pointer or the stack pointer as 
the encoder/decoder key. 
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To implement this mechanism in a compiler, we only need to modify the code 
generation portion of function prologue and epilogue. The layout of the function stack frame 
stays the same, which will maintain the compatibility of compiled programs with other 
existing libraries. This is another advantage of this method, compared with other compiler 
enhancement approaches, which generally involve modifications of stack frame layout. For 
example, in StackGuard, the modified compiler needs to find place to fit a canary into the 
function stack frame. These features together reduce the implementation effort significantly. 
With this security aware compiler in hand, we still need to recompile those critical 
libraries like C run time library and the kernel itself. In library routines, if local buffers (or 
buffers in the heap) are used and unsafe functions like strcpy are called to manipulate 
these buffers, then attacker can still seek to overrun these buffers indirectly. There is no 
fundamental difference between the buffers in user program and the buffers in library 
routines. Even though there are very few, if not any, buffer overflow attack can overrun 
buffers in shared libraries, but it is conceivable that future attacks might be able to do that. 
For the kernel, the same argument applies. 
When the critical libraries like c run time library and kernel have security enhancement, 
the extra instructions added to function prologue and epilogue will be executed not only for 
the user routines, but also every c run time function call and every system call. These will 
significantly increase the overhead associated with the program counter encoding. For 
example, every strcpy call needs to execute at least two more instructions, one for 
encoding, one for decoding. So this puts even tighter constraints for the performance 
efficiency of a particular protection mechanism. For the StackGuard, it is not desirable at all 
to insert a canary into the activation record, check the integrity of the canary, and report the 
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compromise of the return address if non-integrity of the canary is found for a function call as 
simple as strcpy. 
We use the GNU CC compiler version 2.95.3 and modify the code generation portion of 
function prologue and epilogue. Then we recompile the C run-time library libc version 2.1 
from GNU and Linux kernel 2.4.3 with the secure aware compiler on an Intel x86 platform. 
With our implementation, the change of function prologue and epilogue is shown in 
Figure 2. 
Figure 2. Function prologue.and epilogue with program counter encoding. 
pushl %ebp 
movl esp,%ebp 
subl $12,%esp 
movl %ebp,%esp 
popl %ebp 
ret 
Function Prologue 
xorl(%esp) ,%ebp, (%esp) 
pushl %ebp 
movl %esp,%ebp 
Function Epilogue 
movl %ebp,%esp 
popl %ebp 
xorl(%esp) ,%ebp, (%esp) 
ret 
Section 3. Performance Overhead 
For most of the compiler enhancements ofretum address protection, the majority work, 
if not all, is done in function entry and exit sections. Assume that all of the enhancements are 
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done in these sections, the run time overhead of a program that is built with such a compiler 
enhancement is given by 
Overhead = n * FI IC 
Where 
n = number of extra instructions added into the function prologue and epilogue 
F = number of function calls which have the extra instructions added in the 
prologue and epilogue 
IC= instruction count (without the extra instructions added by the compiler 
enhancement) 
So the theoretical overhead associated with a compiler enhancement method depends on 
the ratio of the number of function calls to the instruction count, of course, also on the 
number of extra instructions needed per function call. This ratio will vary across different 
type of applications and also depends on the style of source code, i.e., whether there are a lot 
of function calls. We can get a rough estimate of this ratio using the benchmark. 
SPEC95 INT benchmarks were used for a rough estimation of the ratio of number of 
function calls verses the instruction count. Inside the SPEC95 INT package, there are 7 
benchmarks, they are 
1. "Go" application, an artificial intelligence application 
2. "GCC", the well-known GCC compiler 
3. "Perl", the perl interpreter 
4. "Lisp", the Lisp interpreter 
5. "Vortex", a database application 
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6. "Compress", a data compression application which is 110 intensive 
7. "m88ksim", a Motorola 88k architecture simulator 
To get full set of statistics of these benchmarks, we run them in a simulator, the 
SimpleSim, and use the sim-profiler to collect the statistics. The following table contains 
these statistics for some of the benchmarks. For some of the benchmark programs, such as 
"Go", "Perl", and "Lisp", multiple data sets were used. The ratios of function calls over total 
instructions vary from 1.07% to 3.33%, with the most ratios falling around 2%. Suppose this 
ratio is about 3%, for our implementation, with either the frame pointer or the stack pointer 
as the encoding key, the number of extra instructions will be 2, and the predicted typical 
overhead will be 6%, which is almost ignorable. 
Table 1. Ratio of function calls versus total instructions for SPEC95 CINT benchmarks 
Total Function Ratio of 
Benchmark Total Instructions Call Direct Call Indirect Calls Calls/lnsns 
Go, Null data 35839364540 382303056 19 382303075 1.07% 
Go, Train data 548130806 6028418 19 6028437 1.10% 
GCC, Train data 253113261 2938332 156322 3094654 1.22% 
Perl, Jumble data 2391507167 39824778 39824778 79649556 3.33% 
Perl, Prism data 10513027 170619 34 170653 1.62% 
Perl, Scrible data 40485598 732355 100 732455 1.81% 
Lisp, Full Refer data 55438296151 1549371314 28951797 1578323111 2.85% 
Lisp, Train Data 183285616 5075317 114729 5190046 2.83% 
Vortex, Train Data 2520154652 53565291 14879 53580170 2.13% 
But for other methods of return address protection with compiler enhancement, the extra 
instructions per function call can easily be more than 10 or 20 instructions. Then the 
overhead will be easily more than 30% or 60%. 
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Performance Experiments 
The benchmark can give us a rough estimate of the performance overhead of our method. We 
also did a macro benchmark test for the overhead of our method. We measured the 
performance of Apache Web server using the WebStone benchmark [16], built with both 
normal GCC and our security aware compiler. The test was also done by Cowan [12] for the 
StackGuard. The WebStone benchmark tests performance of web server by sending 
simulated requests from different clients to the web server and measuring different statistics 
like response time to clients, server throughput, etc. This test was run on a Pentium 233MHz 
machine with 32M memory. The result of this test is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Apache Web server performance with and without PC Encoding 
Connection Rate(Connections/sec) Average Latency (sec.) Average Throughput (Mbit/sec) 
#of No PC With PC Overhead( No PC With PC Overhead( No PC With PC Overhead( 
Clients Encoding Encoding %) Encoding Encoding %) Encoding Encoding %) 
4 165.15 160.27 2.95% 0.024 0.023 -4.17% 23.14 22.48 2.85% 
8 168.18 159.18 5.35% 0.046 0.049 6.52% 24.06 21.66 9.98% 
12 184.00 173.87 5.51% 0.064 0.067 4.69% 25.82 23.91 7.40% 
16 184.33 184.40 -0.04% 0.080 0.084 5.00% 26.94 27.29 -1.30% 
20 192.62 191.53 0.57% 0.100 0.091 -9.00% 27.28 27.00 1.03% 
24 187.77 183.77 2.13% 0.120 0.120 0.00% 27.79 26.74 3.78% 
28 193.20 192.53 0.35% 0.129 0.135 4.65% 28.10 26.65 5.16% 
32 199.20 204.27 -2.55% 0.147 0.142 -3.40% 27.78 26.73 3.78% 
From Table 2, for the connection rate, the biggest overhead of PC encoding is 5.51%with12 
clients, and the Apache server even had a performance gain from PC encoding of up to 
2.55%, when 32 clients were connected. For the average latency, the biggest overhead is 
6.52% with 8 clients, but there was also a performance gain of9.0%with 20 clients. For the 
average throughput of the web server, the biggest overhead is 9.98% with 8 clients, and there 
is also a performance gain of 1.3% with 16 clients. Theoretically, there should not be any 
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performance gains of the security aware web server, the performance gains we observed 
could be simply coming from noise. So generally speaking, even though there is some 
performance overhead, this overhead is so small that it is even not statistically significant. 
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Chapter 5. Exploit Experiments 
To prove the effectiveness of the proposed method, few experiments of some exploits 
were conducted. 
Section 1. Exploits 
elm2.5.3 
First this package is compiled with GCC 2 • 9 5 • 3. The original exploit written by_ kiss, 
was modified to cope with wide range of memory addresses which can successfully exploit 
the elm program. In Red Hat 7.0, there is a pre-built elm with version 2.5.3 installed. The 
source package of the same version is obtained to enable the compilation with the security 
aware compiler. The exploit code is then used to exploit the original elm2 . 5. 3. With an 
exploit buffer of size 300 bytes, one can successfully smash the internal buffer of elm with a 
wide range of offset. The shellcode is put in the middle of the exploit buffer, before that is 
NOPs, the memory after that are all filled with the return addresses. The exploit takes 
advantage of the 11 - f 11 option of the elm, which is used for forwarding a mail. Then the same 
source was compiled with GCC 2 • 9 5 • 3 and the same exploit was conducted, the results 
were similar to the results obtained from the pre-built version. Finally, the elm package were 
built with PC encoding, either with the frame pointer as the key or the stack pointer as the 
key. For the frame pointer as the PC encoding key, all of the exploits which work with elm 
built with non-security GCC failed, and the program halted with segmentation fault with the 
PC values as zeroes. For the case of exploiting the elm built with the security aware 
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compiler with stack pointer as the encoding key, all of the exploits failed too, with 
segmentation faults, and the PC values all had the pattern of "OxOOOOxxxx". These results 
matched the expectation. 
inn-2.2.3 
INN (InterNetNews), originally written by Rich Salz, is an extremely flexible and 
configurable Usenet I netnews news server. The following vulnerability exists in the 
"innf eed/rnisc. c" file. 
vsprintf (buffer,frnt,ap) ; /* line 159 */ 
The exploit code useed an attack string of size of 600 bytes, filled with normal shellcode 
for spawning a shell in the middle, NOP's before the shellcode, and return addresses after the 
shellcode. With an INN that was compiled with standard GCC running, the exploit code could 
successfully overwrite the return address in the stack frame which contained the code shown 
above and obtained a shell that has a user id of "news", group id of "news". The return 
address that was used to overwrite the stack location of the original return address can be 
selected from a wide range, which means that this vulnerability can be easily exploited. With 
an INN compiled with the secured compiler with the frame pointer as the encoding/decoding 
· key, none of the exploits that worked before worked. The program halted with segmentation 
fault and the program counter contained a 0. With an INN compiled with the secured 
compiler using the stack pointer as the encoding/decoding key, none of the exploits that 
worked before worked either. The program halted with a segmentation fault. The program 
counter contained values that had a pattern of "OxOOOOxxxx". 
Fancylogin-0.99. 7 
This is a login manager program. This program has a local buffer of 128 bytes long 
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which is used to store the host name for remote login. It uses a strcpy to copy from a 
command line argument to this buffer. The exploit code uses a string with length of 400 
bytes filled with shellcode to overrun the buffer. When the login manager is compiled by a 
normal GCC compiler, the exploit code can obtain a shell. With the login manager built with 
the secure enhanced compiler, none of the exploits worked. The login manager halted with 
PC value of 0 when the encoding key is the frame pointer. If the login manager is built with 
the stack pointer as the encoding key, all of the PC values when the program halted had a 
pattern of "OxOOOOxxxx". 
LPRng-3.6.22-5 
This is the default lpr print server installed on RedHat 7.0 system. It runs as a daemon 
with root privilege when system starts up. This version of LPRng has a buffer overflow 
vulnerability when it forms syslog strings. So by exploiting this server, attackers can get a 
full control of the target system. This is a remote buffer overflow exploit. The shellcode of 
this exploit contains the normal shellcode used in a typical local buffer overflow attack to 
spawn a shell. Beyond this, the shellcode also opens a TCP port (other than those well-know 
. ports) and connects the stdin/ stdout of the spawned shell to this port. By doing this, if 
the return address on the activation record which contains the buffer being successfully 
overwritten and the shellcode got executed inside the server, then the attacker can get an 
interactive shell with root uid/ gid. Using a brute force method, an interactive root shell 
can be spawned inside one worker process of the lpd. Actually, it's not really a shell, it does 
not have a shell prompt, only the standard in/out of the shell are connected to network socket, 
so it accepts commands and dump the results of execution of the command. After recompile 
the source RPM with our PC encoding (with either the frame pointer or the stack pointer as 
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the encoding/decoding key) compiler, the worker processes of lpd exit when they get the 
malicious exploit string and so no shells can be spawned and the main lpd daemon is still 
alive taking further requests. 
Section 2. Limitations and Future Work 
From the different exploit experiments conducted, one can see that the proposed method 
is very effective in preventing the traditional "stack smashing" type of buffer overflow 
attacks. It can successfully halt the program execution with segmentation fault when the 
control flow is transferred to malicious instructions which are injected into the memory space 
of the running program by the attacking code. However, there are also some limitations in the 
method. 
Detection of Attacks 
At this time, the implementation does not support detection of compromised PC values, 
i.e., detection of attacks, which is desired under some circumstances. Generally, there are two 
ways to achieve this. 
The first method is by checking the status of some objects other than the return address 
which is guaranteed to be modified when attackers break in. For example, StackGuard 
detects buffer overflow attacks by checking the integrity of the canary placed before the 
return address in the activation record. For the current implementation, there are no such 
objects available at this time. But this method will fail if attackers can overwrite the return 
address without modifying the indication object. For instance, future smarter attacks can 
potentially overwrite just the return address, leaving the memory locations around the return 
address untouched. Under such circumstances, methods like StackGuard will fail to prevent 
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the attack. But the secured compiler implementation will not, since it relies on return address 
encoding/decoding instead of checking the status of other indicators. In terms of this, the 
implementation is more robust. 
Another way to detect attack is by keeping a copy of every PC values written to stack in 
some places that are safe enough and then compare these copies to the return addresses 
popped from the stack when functions return. On microarchitecture level, those places could 
be a parallel register stack for saving the trace of PC values, and be hidden to programs. But 
for a compiler support only, the only available place is the memory. And the memory region 
of saving these PC copies needs to be protected from possible reading/modifying by 
attackers. 
So exploiting these and new methods to support compromised PC detection would be 
one feasible direction for future work. 
Preventing More Complicated Attacks 
At this time, the implementation does not support preventing non-stack-smashing type 
of buffer overflows, such as heap buffer overflow, function pointer related buffer overflow 
attacks, etc. This should be some of the possible areas for future research. Also for the 
traditional stack smashing attacks, smarter attacks might be able to guess the 
encoding/decoding function and the key. Making this more secure from being defeated is 
also an important research problem. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusions 
Buffer overflow will continue to be one of the biggest sources of security vulnerabilities. 
This work examined the working mechanism of buffer overflow attacks, mainly the 
traditional attack format, i.e. "stack smashing". Different methods proposed to prevent buffer 
overflow attacks were also reviewed and our method for preventing buffer overflow attacks 
in run-time was presented. By encoding/decoding every PC values saved on stack, the 
proposed method can effectively prevent the traditional stack smashing type of buffer 
overflow attacks. The experiments conducted showed that the vulnerable software compiled 
with the enhanced GCC compiler halted in the case of a modified PC value as a result of a 
stack smashing attack. Performance experiments also showed that the method is quite 
competitive in terms of run-time performance. Furthermore, it almost does not impose any 
significant run-time overhead, which is another big advantage of the method compared with 
other similar methods in this class. In addition, it also has partial ability of detecting 
compromised PC values on stack, i.e., detecting of possible attacks. This approach is very 
successful in providing an efficient and effective protection to programs with potential buffer 
overflow flaws. On the other hand, the method has its own limitations. It does not provide 
protections from other advanced types of buffer overflow attacks like heap buffer overflow 
attacks. It does not prevent buffer overflow attacks via function pointer. But all of these 
limitations cannot keep this method from being a practically useful one to prevent the most 
common buffer overflow attacks. 
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